Click covers for more information. 

Below, you can find most of my papers. I have not uploaded all my articles prior to 1995.  I can supply articles prior to 1995 that are not included here, if you send me an email.

“Can Only Meat Machines Be Conscious?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Forthcoming.

• This article is embargoed until it is published, probably in late September, 2025.

“A Speculative Argument against Consciousness in AI (and Perhaps Some Invertebrates).” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Forthcoming.

• Reply to Seth (PhilPapers)

“Formation vs Vulcanization of Perception.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Forthcoming.

• Reply to Fleming and Michel (PhilPapers)

“Précis of The Border between Seeing and Thinking.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110, no. 1 (2025): 273–83. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13126. (PhilPapers)

“Responses to Critics.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110, no. 1 (2025): 325–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13127. (PhilPapers)

Replies to Quilty-Dunn, Beck, Gross; and Schellenberg, Fink, Schoonover, and Peterson. 

Michel, Matthias, Jorge Morales, Ned Block, and Hakwan Lau. “Aphantasia as Imagery Blindsight.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 29, no. 1 (2025): 8–9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2024.11.002. (PhilPapers)

Frey, Haley G., Lua Koenig, Ned Block, Biyu J. He, and Jan W. Brascamp. “Memory Representations during Slow Change Blindness.” Journal of Vision 24, no. 9 (2024): 8. https://doi.org/10.1167/jov.24.9.8. (PhilPapers)

“What Does Decoding from the PFC Reveal about Consciousness?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 28, no. 9 (2024): 804–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2024.05.004. 

“States of Mind.” Science 384, no. 6696 (2024): 629–629. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adp2435. 

“Perception Is Iconic, Perceptual Working Memory Is Discursive.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46 (2023): e265. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X23001899. (PhilPapers)

• Reply to Quilty-Dunn, Porot, and Mandelbaum (PhilPapers)

“Let’s Get Rid of the Concept of an Object File.” In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, 1st ed., edited by Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen. Wiley, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781394259847.ch27. (PhilPapers)

Walker, Edgar Y.*, Stephan Pohl*, Rachel N. Denison, David L. Barack, Jennifer Lee, Ned Block, Wei Ji Ma†, and Florent Meyniel†. “Studying the Neural Representations of Uncertainty.” Nature Neuroscience 26, no. 11 (2023): 1857–67. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41593-023-01444-y. (*co-first authors, †co-senior authors) 

“Responses to My Critics.” Analysis 83, no. 3 (2023): 575–88. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anac058. (PhilPapers)

• This is a reply to two critiques of my book, The Border between Seeing and Thinking (1) by Ian Phillips and Chaz Firestone, “Visual adaptation and the purpose of perception” (PhilPapers) and (2) by Steven Gross, “Language and the Border between Perception and Cognition” (PhilPapers)

“Do Conscious Decisions Cause Physical Actions?” In Free Will, edited by Uri Maoz and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Oxford University Press, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0012. 

Denison, Rachel N., Ned Block, and Jason Samaha. “What Do Models of Visual Perception Tell Us about Visual Phenomenology?” In Neuroscience and Philosophy, edited by Felipe De Brigard and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. The MIT Press, 2022. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0014. 

Raccah, Omri, Ned Block, and Kieran C.R. Fox. “Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain.” The Journal of Neuroscience 41, no. 10 (2021): 2076–87. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1141-20.2020. (PhilPapers)

“Finessing the Bored Monkey Problem.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 24, no. 3 (2020): 167–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.12.012. (PhilPapers)

• This is a response to Ian Phillips and Jorge Morales, “The Fundamental Problem with No-Cognition Paradigms” (PhilPapers)

• That article is in turn a reply to the one immediately below.

“What Is Wrong with the No-Report Paradigm and How to Fix It.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23, no. 12 (2019): 1003–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.10.001. (PhilPapers)

Replies to papers in Pautz, Adam, and Daniel Stoljar, eds. Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. The MIT Press, 2018. (PhilPapers)

• “The Direct Realist Approach to Illusion: Reply to Bill Brewer.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0003. 

• “Tyler Burge on Perceptual Adaptation.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0005. 

• “Attention Affects Appearance: Response to Marisa Carrasco.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0007.

• “David Chalmers on Shape and Color.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0009.

• “Reply to Frank Jackson on A Priori Necessitation.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0011.

• “Empirical Science Meets Higher-Order Views of Consciousness: Reply to Hakwan Lau and Richard Brown.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0013.

• “Geoff Lee’s Hegemony of the Third Person.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0015.

• “Strong Representationism and Unconscious Perception: Reply to Janet Levin.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0017.

• “Intuitions and the Metaphysics of Mind: Reply to Joe Levine.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0019.

• “Puzzled about Sensory Qualities: Reply to Bill Lycan.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0021.

• “Functional Role, Superficialism, and Commander Data: Reply to Brian McLaughlin.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0023.

• “Arguments Pro and Con on Adam Pautz’s External Directedness Principle.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0025.

• “Concepts and Percepts: Reply to Hilary Putnam.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0027.

• “Sydney Shoemaker on Transparency and the Inverted Spectrum.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0029.

• “Attention as a Conduit: Reply to Nicholas Silins and Susanna Siegel.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0031.

• “Poise, Dispositions, and Access Consciousness: Reply to Daniel Stoljar.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0033.

• “Fading Qualia: A Response to Michael Tye.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0035.

• “Optimal Attention: Reply to Sebastian Watzl.” In Blockheads!, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. The MIT Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0037. 

“If Perception Is Probabilistic, Why Does It Not Seem Probabilistic?” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 373, no. 1755 (2018): 20170341. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0341. (PhilPapers)

• This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.

Carter, Olivia, Jakob Hohwy, Jeroen Van Boxtel, Victor Lamme, Ned Block, Christof Koch, and Naotsugu Tsuchiya. “Conscious Machines: Defining Questions.” Science 359, no. 6374 (2018): 400–400. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aar4163.

• Response to Stanislas Dehaene, Hakwan Lau & Sid Kouider, "What is consciousness, and could machines have it?" Science 358, no. 6362 (2017): 486-492. 

Peters, Megan A. K., Robert W. Kentridge, Ian Phillips, and Ned Block. “Does Unconscious Perception Really Exist? Continuing the ASSC20 Debate.” Neuroscience of Consciousness 2017, no. 1 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/nix015. 

• Four contributions by the authors. 

• A variant of my contribution is in “Visioni Dall’inconscio.” Il Sole 24 ORE, May 12, 2017. https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/visioni-dall-inconscio--AE0u0FIB. 

Morales, Jorge, Yasha Mouradi, Claire Sergent, Ned Block, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, David Rosenthal, Piercesare Grimaldi, and Hakwan Lau. “Measuring Away an Attentional Confound?” Neuroscience of Consciousness 2017, no. 1 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/nix018. (PhilPapers)

“Tweaking the Concepts of Perception and Cognition.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39 (2016): e232. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X15002733. (PhilPapers)

• Reply to Firestone and Scholl (PhilPapers)

• See Firestone and Scholl’s response

“The Anna Karenina Principle and Skepticism about Unconscious Perception.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93, no. 2 (2016): 452–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12258. (PhilPapers)

• This is a response to Ian Phillips (PhilPapers)

Phillips, Ian, and Ned Block. “Debate on Unconscious Perception.” In Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, edited by Bence Nanay. Routledge, 2016. (PhilPapers)

“The Puzzle of Perceptual Precision.” In Open MIND, 2-Vol. Set, edited by Thomas Metzinger and Jennifer M. Windt. The MIT Press, 2016. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10603.003.0016. (PhilPapers)

• The entire book is available for free here. 

• Commentary by Sascha Benjamin Fink, “Phenomenal Precision and Some Possible Pitfalls” (PhilPapers)

• My reply to Fink, “Solely Generic Phenomenology” (PhilPapers)

“The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground.” In Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes From the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim, edited by Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates, and David Sosa. Cambridge University Press, 2015. (PhilPapers)

Block, Ned, David Carmel, Stephen M. Fleming, Robert W. Kentridge, Christof Koch, Victor A.F. Lamme, Hakwan Lau, and David Rosenthal. “Consciousness Science: Real Progress and Lingering Misconceptions.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18, no. 11 (2014): 556–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2014.09.004.

• Reply from Paller and Suzuki

“Consciousness, Big Science, and Conceptual Clarity.” In The Future of the Brain: Essays by the World’s Leading Neuroscientists, edited by Gary Marcus and Jeremy Freeman. Princeton University Press, 2014. (PhilPapers)

“Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89, no. 3 (2014): 560–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12135. (PhilPapers)

• Reply from Burge

“Rich Conscious Perception Outside Focal Attention.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18, no. 9 (2014): 445–47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2014.05.007. (PhilPapers)

“The Defective Armchair: A Reply to Tye.” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3, no. 2 (2014): 159–65. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.124. (PhilPapers)

• A response to Tye

“Seeing and Windows of Integration.” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2013): 29–39. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.62. (PhilPapers)

• Elaborates the argument in “The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention” (see below), and replies to critiques by Bradley Richards and J. H. Taylor.

Block, Ned, and Susanna Siegel. “Attention and Perceptual Adaptation.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36, no. 3 (2013): 205–6. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12002245. (PhilPapers)

• A comment on Clark

“The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention.” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 3 (2012): 170–84. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.28. (PhilPapers)

Tsuchiya, Naotsugu, Ned Block, and Christof Koch. “Top-down Attention and Consciousness: Comment on Cohen et al.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16, no. 11 (2012): 527. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.09.004. (PhilPapers)

O’Regan, J. Kevin, and Ned Block. “Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s ‘Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness.’” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3, no. 1 (2012): 89–108. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0090-7. (PhilPapers)

“Response to Kouider et al.: Which View Is Better Supported by the Evidence?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16, no. 3 (2012): 141–42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.01.008. (PhilPapers)

“Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15, no. 12 (2011): 567–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.001. (PhilPapers)

“The Higher Order Approach to Consciousness Is Defunct.” Analysis 71, no. 3 (2011): 419–31. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr037. (PhilPapers)

• Replies from Rosenthal (PhilPapers) and Weisberg (PhilPapers)

• My response: “Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg.” Analysis 71, no. 3 (2011): 443–48. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr036. (PhilPapers)

“The Anna Karenina Theory of the Unconscious.” Neuropsychoanalysis 13, no. 1 (2011): 34–37. (PhilPapers)

• This is a commentary on Berlin

“What Was I Thinking?” Books. The New York Times, November 26, 2010. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/books/review/Block-t.html. 

• Review of Damasio, Self Comes to Mind

“Attention and Mental Paint.” Philosophical Issues 20, no. 1 (2010): 23–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00177.x. (PhilPapers)

Block, Ned, and Philip Kitcher. “Misunderstanding Darwin: Natural selection’s secular critics get it wrong.” Boston Review, March 1, 2010. https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/ned-block-philip-kitcher-misunderstanding-darwin-natural-selection/. 

• Review of Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, What Darwin Got Wrong (PhilPapers)

“Comparing the Major Theories of Consciousness.” In The Cognitive Neurosciences, 4th ed., edited by Michael S. Gazzaniga. The MIT Press, 2009. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/8029.003.0099. (PhilPapers)

“Consciousness and Cognitive Access.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 108, no. 1pt3 (2008): 289–317. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2008.00247.x. (PhilPapers)

• This is a much shorter version of the paper below, aimed more at philosophers than scientists, and incorporating improved formulations and replies to some of the commentators listed below.

“Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, nos. 5–6 (2007): 481–99. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X07002786. (PhilPapers)

• The publication includes 32 commentaries by Balog, Burge, Byrne Hilbert & Siegel, Clark & Kiverstein, Gopnik, Grush, Harman, Hulme & Whitely, Izard Quinn & Most, Jacob, Kentridge, Koch & Tsuchiya, Kouider, Gardelle & Dupoux, Lamme, Landman & Sligte, Lau & Persaud, Laureys, Levine, Lycan, Malach, McDermott, Naccache & Dehaene, O'Regan & Myin, Prinz, Rosenthal, Sergent & Rees, Shanahan & Baars, Snodgrass & Lepisto, Spener, Tye and Van Gulick; and my replies.

“Wittgenstein and Qualia.” Philosophical Perspectives 21, no. 1 (2007): 73–115. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00121.x. (PhilPapers)

• A substantially revised version of this paper was published in a volume in honor of Hilary Putnam: Block, Ned. “Wittgenstein and Qualia.” In Reading Putnam, 1st ed., edited by Maria Baghramian. Routledge, 2012. 

“Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity.” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman. Oxford University Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199290581.003.0001.

• Replies from John Perry (PhilPapers) and Stephen White (PhilPapers)

• This paper also appears in another volume: Block, Ned. “Max Black’s Objection to Mind‐Body Identity.” In Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, 1st ed., by Torin Alter and Sven Walter. Oxford University Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0012. (Amusingly, the simultaneous OUP publications of this article were copy-edited by different copy-editors, leading to slightly different versions.)

“Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism.” In Pain, edited by Murat Aydede. The MIT Press, 2005. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5211.003.0008. (PhilPapers)

“Review: Action in Perception by Alva Noë.” Journal of Philosophy 102, no. 5 (2005): 259–72. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2005102524. (PhilPapers)

“Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9, no. 2 (2005): 46–52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.006. (PhilPapers)

• A longer version of this paper appears as: Block, Ned. “Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness.” In Consciousness, Function, and Representation, Collected Papers, Volume 1. The MIT Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2111.003.0021. 

“The Merely Verbal Problem of Consciousness.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9, no. 6 (2005): 270. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.009. (PhilPapers)

• Reply to Baars and Laureys

“Neurophilosophy or Philoneuroscience.” Science 301, no. 5638 (2003): 1328–29. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1084934. 

• This is a review of: Churchland, Patricia Smith. Brain Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. A Bradford Book. MIT Press, 2002. (PhilPapers)

“Mental Paint.” In Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, edited by Martin Hahn and Björn T. Ramberg. MIT Press, 2003. (PhilPapers)

• A reply from Burge

“Do Causal Powers Drain Away?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67, no. 1 (2003): 133–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00029.x. (PhilPapers)

• A reply from Jaegwon Kim (PhilPapers)

“Spatial Perception via Tactile Sensation.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7, no. 7 (2003): 285–86. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00132-3. (PhilPapers)

• Note: The journal incorrectly reversed the noun phrases in the title.

• This is a reply to Hurley and Noë (PhilPapers)

• A reply from Hurley and Noë

“The Harder Problem of Consciousness.” The Journal of Philosophy 99, no. 8 (2002): 391. https://doi.org/10.2307/3655621. (PhilPapers)

• A longer version of this paper appears in: Block, Ned. “Petrus Hispanus Lectures 2003. The Harder Problem of Consciousness.” Disputatio 1, no. 15 (2003): 4–49. https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2003-0007. (PhilPapers); and in Block, Ned. “The Harder Problem of Consciousness.” In Consciousness, Function, and Representation, Collected Papers, Volume 1. The MIT Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2111.003.0025.

• Reply from McLaughlin (PhilPapers) and Hohwy (PhilPapers)

“Concepts of Consciousness.” In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by David John Chalmers. Oxford University Press, 2002. (PhilPapers)

“Paradox and Cross Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness.” Cognition 79, nos. 1–2 (2001): 197–219. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00129-3. (PhilPapers)

• This is a commentary on a special issue of Cognition, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness, edited by Stanislas Dehaene, which was subsequently published as a book: Dehaene, Stanislas, ed. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness. Cognition Special Issues. MIT Press, 2001.

• Two philosophers, Dan Dennett and I, were asked to comment on the scientists’ papers in the special issue. (We both made comments on each others’ papers as well.) Dennett’s paper is available here. 

• An expanded and revised version of my commentary appears in: Block, Ned. “Paradox and Cross-Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness.” In Consciousness, Function, and Representation, Collected Papers, Volume 1. The MIT Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2111.003.0019. 

“Behaviorism Revisited.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, no. 5 (2001): 977–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X01270113. (PhilPapers)

• Reply to O’Regan and Noë (PhilPapers)

“Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness.” Philosophical Topics 26, no. 1 (1999): 39–70. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics1999261/233. (PhilPapers)

Block, Ned, and Robert Stalnaker. “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap.” The Philosophical Review 108, no. 1 (1999): 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/2998259. (PhilPapers)

“Is Experiencing Just Representing?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, no. 3 (1998): 663. https://doi.org/10.2307/2653766. (PhilPapers)

• Review of Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness (PhilPapers)

“How to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 (March 1998): 23–34. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004288. (PhilPapers)

“Anti‐Reductionism Slaps Back.” Noûs 31, no. s11 (1997): 107–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.31.s11.5. (PhilPapers)

“How Can We Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness?” Trends in Neurosciences 19, no. 11 (1996): 456–59. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-2236(96)20049-9. 

• A revised version appears in: Block, Ned. “How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.” In Consciousness, Function, and Representation, Collected Papers, Volume 1. The MIT Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2111.003.0018. 

“On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18, no. 2 (1995): 227–47. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00038188. (PhilPapers)

• The linked article above includes commentaries and my replies. 

• A corrected version of this article appears in: Block, Ned, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere, eds. The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. The MIT Press, 1997. 

• A second round of critiques was also published. These critiques plus replies appeared in: Block, Ned. “Biology versus Computation in the Study of Consciousness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20, no. 1 (1997): 159–65. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X97330052. (PhilPapers)

“How Heritability Misleads about Race.” Cognition 56, no. 2 (1995): 99–128. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(95)00678-R. (PhilPapers)

• A shortened version was published: Block, Ned. “Race, Genes, and IQ.” Boston Review, 1996. https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/ned-block-race-genes-and-iq/. 

“An Argument for Holism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95, no. 1 (1995): 151–70. https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/95.1.151. (PhilPapers)

“What Is Dennett’s Theory a Theory of?” Philosophical Topics 22, no. 1 (1994): 23–40. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics1994221/22. (PhilPapers)

“Holism, Hyper‐analyticity and Hyper‐compositionality.” Mind & Language 8, no. 1 (1993): 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1993.tb00267.x. (PhilPapers)

“Review: Consciousness Explained by Daniel C. Dennett.” Journal of Philosophy 90, no. 4 (1993): 181–93. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil199390448. 

“Evidence against Epiphenomenalism.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14, no. 4 (1991): 670–72. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0007179X. (PhilPapers)

• Reply to Velmans (PhilPapers)

“Inverted Earth.” Philosophical Perspectives 4 (1990): 53. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214187. (PhilPapers)

“Consciousness and Accessibility.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13, no. 4 (1990): 596–98. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00080316. (PhilPapers)

• Reply to Searle (PhilPapers)

“Can the Mind Change the World?” In Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam, edited by George Boolos. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990. (PhilPapers)

“Functional Role and Truth Conditions.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61, no. 1 (1987): 157–84. https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/61.1.157. (PhilPapers)

“Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 615–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00558.x. (PhilPapers)

“The Photographic Fallacy in the Debate about Mental Imagery.” Noûs 17, no. 4 (1983): 651. https://doi.org/10.2307/2215087. (PhilPapers)

 “Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science.” The Philosophical Review 92, no. 4 (1983): 499. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184879. (PhilPapers)

“Psychologism and Behaviorism.” The Philosophical Review 90, no. 1 (1981): 5. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184371. (PhilPapers)

“Review: The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. By Julian Jaynes.” Cognition and Brain Theory 4, no. 1 (1981): 81–83.

Block, Ned, and Sylvain Bromberger. “States’ Rights.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no. 1 (1980): 73–74. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00001783. (PhilPapers)

• Reply to Fodor (PhilPapers)

“A Confusion about Innateness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2, no. 1 (1979): 27–29. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00060453. (PhilPapers)

• Reply to Eibl-Eibesfeldt (PhilPapers)

“Troubles with Functionalism.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (1978): 261–325. https://hdl.handle.net/11299/185298. (PhilPapers)

• In 1981, I divided the paper into two parts: a much expanded version of the part on what functionalism is published as: “What Is Functionalism?” In Consciousness, Function, and Representation, Collected Papers, Volume 1. The MIT Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2111.003.0004. The argument against the clarified version of functionalism is published as: “Troubles with Functionalism.” In Consciousness, Function, and Representation, Collected Papers, Volume 1. The MIT Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2111.003.0006. 

• A Spanish version can be found here. 

“Review of Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.” Sec. A17. Boston Globe, March 6, 1977.

“Why Do Mirrors Reverse Right/Left but Not Up/Down.” Journal of Philosophy 71, no. 9 (1974): 259–77. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024963. (PhilPapers)

Block, N. J., and Gerald Dworkin. “IQ, Heritability and Inequality, Part 1.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 3, no. 4 (1974): 331–409. (PhilPapers)

Block, N. J., and Gerald Dworkin. “IQ, Heritability and Inequality, Part 2.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 4, no. 1 (1974): 40–99. (PhilPapers)

Block, Ned, and Jerry. A. Fodor. “What Psychological States Are Not.” The Philosophical Review 81, no. 2 (1972): 159. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183991. (PhilPapers)

• A Spanish version can be found here.

“Review: Studies in Thought and Language, by Joseph L. Cowan.” Journal of Philosophy 69, no. 14 (1972): 427–34. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024855. 

“Holism: Mental and Semantic.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1st ed. Routledge, 2016. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-W015-1. 

“Semantics, Conceptual Role.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1st ed. Routledge, 2016. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-W037-1. 

“The Mind as the Software of the Brain.” In An Invitation to Cognitive Science, edited by Edward E. Smith and Daniel N. Osherson, 3: Thinking. The MIT Press, 1995. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/3966.003.0016. (PhilPapers)

“Consciousness.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 1st ed., edited by Samuel Guttenplan. Wiley, 1995. 

“Functionalism.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 1st ed., edited by Samuel Guttenplan. Wiley, 1995. 

“Qualia.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 1st ed., edited by Samuel Guttenplan. Wiley, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405164597.ch13. 

In 1962 I was a sophomore at MIT and was head of a student group, the MIT Civil Rights Committee which sponsored talks by Malcolm X, James Baldwin and other civil rights leaders of the time.  I did not save any of my correspondence but a number of years ago Garrett Felber who had access to Malcolm X's papers at the University of Michigan sent me copies of my correspondence with Malcolm X.  The copies are barely legible, unfortunately.  I post them here for their historical interest.  There was considerable controversy over the event.  Some of the correspondence in the MIT student newspaper can be seen here.